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Agnosis in the university workplace 
Abstract 
One significant, tangible and interesting challenge for the privatised university is its impedance of 
particular forms of effective engagement and action in teaching and research, notably with respect to 
inequities in the broader social context, and the position of the university within that context. In the face 
of significant resource constraints (themselves the outcome of complex political and economic 
dynamics) intersecting organisational imperatives toward competition, administrative accountability, 
unilateral managerial style and 'best foot forward' promotional culture combine to produce a particular 
lack in socio-political epistemology, referred to here as bad faith 'not-knowing', or ignorance. A central 
paradox is that, although the university is evidently devoted to knowledge production and dissemination, 
and the various issues the sector faces in Australia are well documented (notably: casualisation, ever 
diminishing research funding, and the implications of the massification of teaching), nonetheless, the 
general tendency is towards acquiescence and intensification rather than contestation of the processes 
that give rise to these issues. This not-knowing arises at the intersection of the dissonant and 
incompatible voices that frame the institution as a workplace: the top-down managerial line and its 
commitment to control through 'cost neutrality', the outward-facing advertorial rhetoric of excellence, and 
the routine snark of the embattled workforce attempting to harmonise these discrepant formulations of 
the organisation. It is argued that this empty space of not-knowing is recognisable to people occupying 
roles in other organisations, and that it represents therefore a peculiar opportunity for those interested in 
the future of universities as public institutions: there is more to find out about how these organisationally 
produced epistemic limits are recognisable and consequential across contexts, how they are imposed, 
and how they contain potential. 
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The following paper presents an argument assembled 
via observations regarding university workplaces, which 
will be quite recognisable to readers familiar with the 
Australian academic context. If the argument transpires 
to be an interesting one, perhaps the most interesting 
thing about it might be how easy it is to substantiate, and 
following on from that, the question as to why, given what 
is known and knowable about universities, they seem 
generally to trundle along in much the same direction. It 
is not likely that this latter question could be answered 
just here, and it may be that it is a sort of pseudo-
question. Perhaps in the limited space available we could, 
however, reflect on what such an answer would consist 
of, and what it might entail. If there is something wrong 
with the premises of the question, contemplating that 
might also prove instructive, as it would seem to invite 
consideration of the role played in university workplace 
culture by the discrepancy between public proclamation 
and everyday practice.  As Bourdieu memorably put it: 
‘practice has a logic which is not that of logic’ (1998, 
p. 82). This discrepancy or occlusion, common to many 
workplaces, is especially intriguing in universities, given 
their apparent function as institutional sites for producing 
knowledge and making it available.
I present this argument here for the following reasons: 
it might entertain readers to remember again their social 
and organisational context and how they might evaluate 
their priorities in that context; it might instantiate 
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grounds for forthright consideration of the role played by 
commitments to scholarship, conservatively defined, and 
the cultural and political role of ‘critique’ more broadly in 
universities; and it might clarify how specific economic 
and political logics play out in academic institutions, and 
as such, how they relate to the policy frameworks (and the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of such frameworks) 
driving and governing formal practice in universities.
The argument in brief is that the principal challenge 
facing the privatised university is that its organisational 
culture is not really helping the people who work there 
to do intelligent things. On the contrary, the organisational 
culture of the university leads its occupants to behave in 
accordance with a peculiar combination of ignorance and 
bad faith, produced in and through the aporia mentioned 
above. This vocabulary of ignorance and bad faith, 
elaborated below, should not be understood in a dismissive 
or derogatory sense. The formulation is somewhat clumsy, 
but there does not seem to be an alternate term or phrase 
at hand which effectively captures the conjunction. The 
suggestion is that, as ever, it is interesting to think about 
what we don’t know and how we don’t know it, and 
interesting especially to think about what we don’t know 
about how and why universities work, how they could 
work, and how we might like them to work (or how we 
might like to work in them).
Some commentators, as we shall see presently, are 
inclined to think of this production of ignorance and 
bad faith in a rather conspiratorial fashion, as though 
the system were designed by our cryptic overlords to 
befuddle us in the pursuit of some … thing.  Although 
it does indeed serve the interests of powerful people 
to have universities organised in this way, this unhappy 
accident is probably not really of much consequence to 
those powerful people. University personnel and their 
‘mission’ do not pose a threat to the status quo: they play 
an important role in upholding it. More pertinently for the 
argument at hand, the conspiratorial model gives undue 
credit to the capacity of human intention to consciously 
(albeit ‘remotely’) steer a complex and porous social 
organisation like a university in a definitively meaningful 
way. Such steerage could however be caustically disruptive 
in its consequences: the argument advanced here can be 
considered with this speculation in mind.
In part because there is now an extensive literature in 
‘critical university studies’ (zombieacademy, 2010), it is 
sensible at the outset to sketch preliminary definitions, 
and in that way furnish some background for what 
follows. The idea of ‘the privatised university’ does not 
really have a clear referent: it means different things to 
different people. Furthermore, the idea of the privatised 
university travels alongside other critical descriptions of 
the institution: the neoliberal university, the corporate 
university and so on. One or another of these frameworks 
for running the critique will be more appealing to some 
than to others. Different ways of naming ‘the problem’ 
highlight some aspects of it, but in so doing, obscure 
others. The critiques of interest here, as the other 
articles in this issue attest, are concerned with particular 
challenges within and for the institution, although which 
challenges are considered most salient varies across 
locations and perspectives. The specification, however, 
invariably implies an institution or organisation that has 
been through a process to get to the state it is now in (the 
process of privatisation, corporatisation, neoliberalisation 
or whatever it was). By inference, it was in some other 
state before this process commenced, and therefore could 
be in some further, unspecified or perhaps even desirable 
state in future. Certainly, it won’t be in this state forever.
Readers will be familiar with the broader context, 
which has also been very well rehearsed. Some people 
like to use the word ‘neoliberalism’ as shorthand. There 
are usually two steps here. The opening gambit is the 
assertion of market fundamentalism: according to the 
refrain, the dominant socio-logic asserts that things are 
only worth doing (‘investing in’) if they yield an economic 
return. Competition guarantees efficiency, and thereby 
increases economic gain. Education is a private, rather 
than a public good (so the individual recipient should 
pay). Information or perhaps ‘knowledge’ (something 
seemingly relevant to universities) is rendered productive 
as an exchange value, rather than a use value. Individuals 
invest in this product to increase their own value as 
commodities in the labour market. 
There is a picture of the world here, where an economic 
(really a financial) imperative has primacy and other 
human practices and endeavours should be subordinated 
to it. Economic rationalism is the ultimate sovereign, and 
the guarantor of ‘freedom’. Of course, if one wants to weed 
the kale on a commune, live out in the bush or become 
homeless: fine (as long as there is no trespassing or leeching 
resources off the state). But servicing the economy is the 
only meaningful way to be a person.  Actualisation and 
agency are realised through consumption. People are 
monadic, their behaviour is private, calculated and occurs 
on the basis of self-interested motivation. This perspective 
functions practically both as a model of rational (and 
morally right) action, and a disciplinary mechanism 
structuring institutional fields so as to entail action in 
accordance: rewarding action which validates and assents 
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to the model, and reproving, penalising, or ‘developing’ 
action otherwise. So far, so good. 
The next step, which is sometimes forgotten (and 
the first part is certainly entertaining), usually involves 
something like the following points. Firstly, the social 
world does not really work this way, it does not seem 
to have worked this way for most of human history, and 
people do all sorts of things that are economically deeply 
pointless and nonrational: 
having children, alcoholism, 
going for the St. George 
Illawarra Dragons and so 
on (Graeber, 2011). Homo 
economicus is a wholly 
imaginary creature, and an 
impoverished and mean-
spirited one at that. The 
dominant logic is really a kind of fantastic and impossible 
utopia, and tremendous energy is continuously expended 
to administer this world into its image: 
the unanswerable logic of markets, economic necessity 
and bottom lines becomes a new fundamentalist reli-
gion that turns organisations into a place of darkness, 
where emotional brutality is commonplace and differ-
ent forms of psychological violence, dehumanisation, 
including degradation, humiliation and intimidation, 
have become the norm (Gabriel, 2012, p. 1142).
Secondly, and perhaps more pertinently, the ascendance 
of this rhetoric of economic rationalism occurs 
simultaneously with an unprecedented concentration 
of wealth: the plutonomy of the one per cent (Hardoon, 
2015; Di Muzio, 2015; Piketty, 2013). For these sorts of 
reasons, Brenner and Theodore refer to the process which 
gives rise to the problems under consideration as ‘actually 
existing neoliberalism’ (2002). It is probably safe to assume 
that the co-incidence of neoliberal doctrine (or however 
we might name that) with this concentration of wealth 
is not fortuitous. Keeping this bigger picture in mind can 
have a helpfully clarifying effect in the encounter with 
some of the incongruities we will presently attend to. 
How then, should we approach the architecture of 
this challenge, which is the organisational culture of the 
‘actually existing’ Australian university? One short answer 
to this question might be something like this: as a public 
service institution, the university is not adequately funded 
for the work expected of it (this is before we come to any 
discussion of whether we think it well suited for this sort 
of work, or what sort of work we think it fit for in fact). This 
has been the case for some time and shows no signs of 
reversing.  Among OECD countries, Australian universities 
come in thirty-third out of thirty-four for government 
funding allocated to universities as a percentage of GDP: 
the Australian government would have to increase current 
funding by almost 50 per cent just to get to the OECD 
average (Tiffen, 2015).
A slightly longer answer could be that the various 
strategies which have emerged to deal with the problem 
specified in the short answer are counterproductive – 
in fact, they have become 
interesting new satellite 
problems: the university 
is a kind of constellation 
of problems, each with its 
own orbit, momentum and 
gravitational force. 
To furnish some examples: 
the economy of scale 
sought in Australian university teaching as a cost-cutting 
solution to that first problem seems somehow to be 
hitting the quality ceiling in terms of the capacity to 
provide a meaningful educational encounter. Student-
staff ratio only goes in one direction, and it is not the 
preferred one (McDonald, 2013). This has implications 
for teaching ‘quality’, and by implication, for institutional 
reputation and market appeal. Technological ‘innovation’ 
is presented as a pedagogical salve, although it seems to 
further massify and anonymise that encounter, and has 
also facilitated the entry of edu-tech interests, funded 
by speculative venture capital (Watters, 2015). The 
implication of this is datafication and financialisation (as 
with the leisure pursuits of ‘social media’), which is to say, 
student ‘engagement’ with technology becomes a source 
of monetisable data, which in turn reconfigures what will 
stand as evidence of learning and teaching. Students have 
no part in any conversation about this.
The squeeze has also led to the casualisation of 
academic work. This is effectively collapsing the future 
of the academic profession. It is well known that most 
teaching in Australian universities is now conducted by 
an academic precariat (Rea, 2012). There is a predictable 
gender skew here, shot through how different kinds 
of university work are valued and to whom they are 
allocated (Lynch, 2010). Permanent employment 
insecurity has implications for the psychological 
wellbeing of the university workforce (Berg, Huijbens & 
Larsen, 2016). This is a widely acknowledged institutional 
risk (Saltmarsh & Randell-Moon, 2015). By head count, 
most academic staff, like most university staff, do not 
have ongoing positions (Lane & Hare, 2014). The minority 
of academics who retain such positions are ageing 
Homo economicus is a wholly imaginary 
creature, and an impoverished and mean-
spirited one at that. The dominant logic is 
really a kind of fantastic and impossible 
utopia
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(Bexley, James & Arkoudis, 2011). The consequences 
of casualisation for morale and for teaching quality, 
and what casualisation says about the priorities for 
the institution and its substantive forms of work and 
‘outputs’, are not on the agenda for public discussion. 
There would seem to be something of an issue with the 
role of university accreditation in a society purportedly 
committed to meritocracy where career opportunities 
for some of the most highly qualified people in the 
country are limited to sessional work.
Research is structured exclusively around 
hypercompetitive and continually diminishing state 
research grants. In formal terms successfully competing 
for funding is research, in that it is really the only 
institutionally credible assurance of recognition as 
‘research active’ (not that such status guarantees anything 
intrinsically desirable). In a context otherwise subject to 
hearty logics of austerity, the more money a researcher 
can attract and spend, the better. Profligacy with research 
funding is the objective institutional measure of research 
quality. Organising research around the submission 
of usually unsuccessful grant applications is grossly 
inefficient (Graves, Barnett & Clarke, 2011), but it is also 
conventionally neoliberal by the parameters briefly given 
above: in the absence of a natural market for research 
‘products’, competition for grants proxies for research 
‘excellence’ (Blommaert, 2015).
The university is constituted within Byzantine, sclerotic, 
and deeply antidemocratic bureaucratic processes, 
involving a great many administrative personnel and 
the ritual circulation of documents marked with the 
proper signatures (Ginsberg, 2011). This is said to 
ensure transparency and appropriate oversight. Some 
commentators (for example, Ernst & Young, 2012) have 
implied that unsustainable administrative bloat may be 
what gives rise to the appearance of the short answer 
problem. Occasionally, the fabulous salaries of senior 
management are brought into this discussion (Hare, 2015).
All of these concrete and uncontroversial examples 
(and we could certainly enumerate further) contribute 
to the everyday fabric of university work, and are well 
documented in the literature. This is the context within 
which the observations to follow are situated. In a sense, 
this is all still simply circling around the possibly sensible 
question as to why, although all of this is known to be 
the case, everything seems to go on along just the same 
trajectory. 
Sometimes the simplest answer to this question – that 
‘knowledge resistance’ stymies effective ‘knowledge 
transfer’ where policy makers are driven by ideological 
agendas – seems like the right one (Schlesinger, 2013). 
Ideologues are in charge and don’t care about facts: 
they don’t listen to reason! Collini (2012) suggests that 
although people who produce higher education policy 
basically ignore criticism from academics, such criticism 
must nonetheless be repeated vociferously. That may be, 
but we can distinguish criticism from evidence and ought 
not conflate them, and so this is not entirely satisfactory. 
Moreover, in this way of thinking, it is somehow up to 
someone else, somewhere else, to stop doing what they 
are doing, or even to actually do something different 
altogether.  Asking for somebody else to do something, or 
waiting for something to happen (under the increasingly 
implausible impression perhaps that doing so is the 
‘professional’ thing to do), doesn’t seem to have proved 
fruitful thus far. 
A more sophisticated answer is that the neoliberal 
market form in universities can never be realised, 
and is rather applied selectively and to political ends: 
control, budget, the rhetoric of social inclusion and so 
on (Marginson, 2013). Here the ideologues aren’t true 
ideologues, for they don’t really even believe in the 
ideology themselves (and so those documenting how it 
can be debunked could perhaps be spending their time 
more productively). It does not work how it says it works: 
what is said and what is done are different: the ‘meaning’ 
of what is said should not be evaluated for what it says, 
but rather for what it does or what actions it permits 
or requires. It is not really certain whether the current 
situation is actually favoured by The Powers That Be, or 
merely a weird accidental outcome informed by this 
‘para-ideological’ tinkering. This is interesting territory to 
explore and we shall return to it later.
It might be obvious, but perhaps it is worth pointing 
out just the same that one needs to take or be in some 
position to actually consider those aforementioned 
and well-documented realities as problems, or failures, 
or challenges, or as in some other way suitable for 
intervention from someone. For many people, these 
are matters of indifference, not least because they are 
recognisably rather humdrum iterations of the broader 
and generally disagreeable social context of contemporary 
work in corporate organisational cultures (Wilmott, 
1993; Höpfl, 2005). It is not as though there is something 
unusual or exceptional about universities compared to 
other social locations: the processes of rationalisation and 
intensification customary to universities are ubiquitous, 
although they may occur with varying intensities in 
different locations. The concerns about university 
work can be understood primarily as the concerns of 
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a somewhat idiosyncratic profession in the course of 
being deskilled, or perhaps (in the more old-fashioned 
vocabulary) proletarianised. 
This shift in professional autonomy is a key feature 
of ‘new public management’: the suite of managerial 
practices originally introduced into the public sector 
in the 1980s, ostensibly to increase efficiency through 
emphasis on outputs, competitive, contract-based 
provision, private sector 
accounting techniques, and 
the diffusion of responsibility 
(not power) across the 
workforce hierarchy (Hood 
1995). The diminished 
control academic workers 
possess over their own 
labour and how it is defined 
and assessed highlights how new public management 
appropriates and subverts discourses of democratisation 
and public accountability. ‘Objective’ standards, audit and 
externally defined and imposed measures of performance 
supplant trust in the professions.
Pointing out the cultural and intellectual consequences 
of this collapse of trust, however, is often heard rather 
pithily as an indulgent complaint about being required to 
justify one’s salary (Maltby, 2008). It can be informative 
to compare different professions in terms of their social 
closure and their capacity to defend themselves from 
these managerial forms: doctors, lawyers, engineers 
and university lecturers, for example, have all fared 
rather differently in terms of their capacities to retain 
professional autonomy and control. In developing critical 
arguments around these issues, it can be productive to 
start with the widespread indifference to the conditions 
of university work in mind (that is to say, the extent to 
which this degradation is quite unremarkable to people 
employed in other contexts). Doing so can to some 
extent mitigate the potential risks of being understood 
as occupying or claiming a ‘victim’ position which, to 
many, does not appear congruent with possession of a 
PhD, some residual occupational prestige, and a basically 
middle-class (though possibly downwardly mobile) status. 
Descriptions of ‘the university under attack’ – or worse, 
‘the humanities’ – are therefore often unhelpful, however 
parlous the circumstances, to the extent that they play 
on tacit politics of vocational identity which falsely 
(and perhaps somewhat disingenuously) homogenise 
the institution and its commitments (see, for example, 
Eagleton, 2015, for a particularly pompous instance of 
this). This is deeply alienating and antagonising to those 
who are unmotivated by the magical cakes of bourgeois 
culture and temet nosce.  A sounder tack might be to 
better identify and articulate commonalities across 
organisational sites and working contexts.  As is common 
in other workplaces, academics and others at universities 
seem increasingly to experience ‘organisational 
disidentification’ (Stiles, 2011, p. 6). The university is an 
institution with multiple incompatible identities – it is 
an MIO or ‘multiple identity 
organisation’ (Pratt & 
Foreman, 2000), and there 
is no reason to assume 
that any one group within 
the organisation speaks 
legitimately for or to the 
interests of any other, or 
indeed that the organisation 
could be brought together under any one sign. This 
is precisely the charge often laid at the door of the 
managerial elite by academics, who in so doing perpetrate 
exactly the same identitarian manoeuvre, albeit espousing 
a formulation that better serves their own interests. 
In a distinct idiom to that of MIOs, Cris Shore published 
a paper in 2010 titled ‘Beyond the multiversity’, riffing on 
Clark Kerr’s coinage. The multiversity, Shore argues,
is not the death of the traditional liberal idea of the 
university so much as a shift to a new multi-layered 
conception in which universities are now expected to 
serve a plethora of different functions, social and sym-
bolic as well as economic and political. Government 
no longer conceptualises universities primarily as sites 
for reproducing national culture, or educating people 
for citizenship or equipping individuals with a broad, 
critical liberal education. Rather, it expects universities 
to produce all of these plus its agenda for enhancing 
economic importance, its focus on commercialisation 
of knowledge, and its goals for social inclusion (2010, 
p. 19). 
The university, the implication seems to be, cannot 
please all of the people all of the time. Shore’s position 
is notable because he does not describe the imminent 
demise of some particular sacred totem, as though there 
were one, unitary, overarching logic, but rather, a kind of 
burying alive of this totem alongside and under a whole 
range of other expectations and demands. The university 
as MIO becomes manifest at the juncture where all 
these expectations and demands sediment in such a 
way as to produce tangible contradiction. Organisational 
fragmentation obviously has implications for the identity 
work conducted by members of the organisation, 
compounding the constraints the core activities of the 
organisation are already subject to. 
Universities exhibit an admirably dogged 
commitment to styles of managerial 
control which are, according to even 
mainstream management theory, anathema 
to productive working environments.
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It is then not only that the university is not resourced to 
meet the demands placed upon it from without; it is that 
it is, in addition, internally incommensurable: it cannot 
simultaneously be the same place apparently indexed 
by the various activities and accounts intended for and 
emanating from within. The organisation talks past itself. 
In the interests of brevity, we can review the locus of 
occlusion briefly here.
At a broad or general scale, there is the relentless, asinine 
and sanitised hyperbole of university marketing, which is 
expensive but also, unfortunately, patently transparent to 
anyone subjected to it. This is a kind of amplified noise 
that tends to distort and undermine the possibilities of a 
more thoughtful signal of the sort people might hope to 
encounter from universities, an aggressive reiteration of 
the predictably vacuous language of ‘excellence’, ‘impact’, 
‘ranking’ and ‘world class’ which is oddly both aspirational 
(where we are always going) and factive (kudos to us, we 
are already there!). 
This is combined with a rigidly hierarchical, top-down 
managerial culture, quite incongruent with the packaging 
and PR, under which staff are to understand themselves as 
cost centres: accounting objects which consume resources, 
must constantly justify their presence, and can be moved 
around the organisation in whatever way seems most cost 
effective (Gabriel, 2012). Sometimes an odd commitment 
to the pretence of participatory governance is exhibited; 
with direct and generally publicly unquestioned authority 
softened by quaint and velvety rituals of ‘consultation’ and 
‘feedback’, although essentially decision-making is vertical, 
slippery and opaque. Universities exhibit an admirably 
dogged commitment to styles of managerial control 
which are, according to even mainstream management 
theory, anathema to productive working environments 
(De Vita & Case, 2014). 
Running in counterpoint with these disharmonious 
leading voices of the institution is the back chatter 
and gallows humour of the staff: demoralised, silenced, 
tenacious, isolated, cynical, often uncertain and acutely 
attuned to any shift in tone from management which 
might harbour a threat. This is sometimes practised as a 
grim, passive realpolitik, as though the smartest thing to 
do is nothing but hope to hold on.
These discourses or ways of being (in) the organisation 
are not interesting because of how they line up (or 
don’t) with particular forms of rationality or sociality 
or procedures for establishing meaningful statements. 
They are interesting because they are about practices 
for generating outcomes, not meanings. Imprecision, 
opacity, vagueness, obfuscation and obscurity are not 
problems to be resolved; they are resources for getting 
things done. 
At the nexus of these irreconcilable postures is the 
interesting space, the space of limit or ellipsis where 
ignorance and bad faith are produced. Of course: 
‘organisations produce ignorance, and thus the possibility 
of mistakes, through compartmentalisation and structural 
secrecy’ (Croissant, 2014, p. 9). But we can go further 
than that here. The commitment to making certain types 
of things exhaustively knowable about universities (and 
surely there is an almost morbid excellence of data 
capture, even if this is oriented to rather particular ends: 
think of block grant allocation, workload models and their 
costing, learning analytics, research funding administration, 
library acquisitions, enrolment and attrition patterns, 
parking requirements and revenue…) simultaneously 
produces certain kinds of not-knowing, certain sorts of 
unthinkable things: it shapes the terrain of what is worth 
knowing and what is worth finding out about – what 
will actually count as knowledge. Ferrell, for example, 
has gracefully described how procedures for financial 
acquittal and ethical oversight render particular forms of 
research and community practice impossible (2011; see 
also Hammersley & Traianou, 2011).  As Weber concisely 
pointed out, ‘ignorance somehow agrees with the 
bureaucracy’s interests’ (1946, p. 234). In addition to this, 
the advertorial logic of total excellence tends to saturation, 
as though there were really nothing more to find out 
about doing something better, despite the widespread and 
evident burnout, boreout, soldiering, and apathy.
The space is hedged by various modalities of the turning 
of a blind eye: pretending-not-to-know, prefer-not-to-think-
about-it, as-if-it-was-ok, can’t-deal-with-that-right-now or 
choosing-not-to-acknowledge. These are routine bad faith 
gestures, a symptom and a further challenge of the actually 
existing neoliberal university. The impulse to silence is an 
inadvertent success of the organisation as a control system. 
But there is a deeper agnosis also: a kind of dispossession 
of the imagination. Faber and Proops provide a helpful 
definition of ‘closed ignorance’, whereby ‘we either 
neglect problems themselves, or do not take notice of 
intuitive insights, experience, information, models and 
methods of solution which are available inside of society’ 
(1998, p. 117). It is a space of a kind of limit to change, to 
ownership, to action, and it is corrosive to the academic 
project overall, if that is understood to involve the 
articulation and development of active curiosity and the 
capacity to exercise it creatively and productively. 
We can say that the dominant ways of framing and 
organising university work tend to produce ignorance 
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insofar as teaching and research are cast in such a way as 
to foreclose alternative forms of pedagogy or community 
engagement which would make more widely known 
and therefore real the possibility of actually really doing 
things in different ways. To pick an example more or less 
at random: thinking seriously about the implications of 
living in the plutonomic world gestured at in the opening 
paragraphs, and thinking seriously about what it means 
to play a role in the production of graduates for work 
and civic engagement in a context where the state plays 
a generative rather than remedial role in the production 
of precarity, marginality and economic inequality (Slater, 
2012). That is to say, we could actively query why, given 
what we do know about the structural production of 
complex social problems, everything seems to go along 
just the same. What is it that we don’t know?
At the same time, then, this interesting space is the space 
of dereliction, which can be utilised to do unexpected 
things, because it is the sort of space nobody is really 
looking at, they can just feel that it is there. The what-we-
don’t-know is actually quite exciting, and is often one of 
the reasons people are drawn to research and study in the 
first place: it is fun to find out new things.
This article consists of an argument, for the most part 
uncontentious, about impediments to effectiveness in 
university processes, through intersecting logics that 
thwart creativity and lead people to refrain from full 
and open participation. Similar impediments can be 
encountered elsewhere, in other organisational contexts, 
where such contexts constitute the very fabric of social 
life. This makes it all the more important to document, 
investigate and contest them. I would like to conclude by 
alluding again to the scepticism expressed above about 
the possibility of steering organisations like universities 
effectively via the ‘at a distance’ policy mechanisms 
currently favoured by Western states.  As the sociological 
canon reminds us again and again, institutions are 
emergent outcomes of patterned and above all contingent 
interactions, which could always go otherwise. They 
are always dynamic and always in flux, and thus those 
who attend (to) them are always actively participating 
and always having effects. Finally, given the asymmetric 
nature of knowledge and ignorance, it is perhaps also 
worth reflecting on Henry Kissinger’s memorable quip: 
conventional forces of domination lose if they do not win; 
but all you have to do to win is not lose (1969, p. 214).
Andrew Whelan is a sociologist with the School of Humanities 
and Social Inquiry at the University of Wollongong, NSW. 
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